Dictators at Sea: Domestic Economic Conditions of Autocracies and the Militarization of Maritime Claims

Abstract

How do domestic economic situations influence different autocrats’ behavior when having diplomatic disputes in contentious issues, particularly maritime claims? This paper argues that military regimes, with their lack of political infrastructure to maintain stability and excessive bias toward violent solutions, are more likely to militarize diplomatic disputes compared to their civilian autocracies. To test this argument, the study analyzes observational data on dyads with contentious issues, including maritime ones, that involve military and civilian authoritarian regimes. The results show mixed support for my theoretical argument. Interestingly, statistical evidence shows that, while military regimes are actually less likely to resort to diversionary use of force over ongoing issue claims when facing economic decline (compared to civilian autocrats and democracies), they are more likely to start conflict even when their economies achieve positive growth. When they have a maritime claim that contains oil, military regimes also exert this greedy behavior and tend to start conflict more often as their economies grow. These findings provide relevant implications for our understanding of how domestic conditions and contextual features shape autocratic conflict behavior, especially with the recent rise of authoritarian regimes and their increasing involvement in contentious issues around the globe.